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I. INTRODUCTION
THE UNITED STATES government has a responsibility and
interest in protecting the safety of its citizens who travel and
live abroad. Nevertheless, travel today for American citizens has
never been more dangerous. Statistics reveal that over 450 mil-
lion passengers board 6.5 million flights annually at American
* The author would like to thank Robert Papkin and Alan Mendelsohn for
their assistance and contributions.
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airports.' Recent studies show that, except for the record year
of 1985, more people died in airline accidents during the first
part of 1994 than in the same time period of any other year in
the last decade.' It is thus clear that safety abroad affects many
Americans.
International air safety initiatives involve issues related to ter-
rorism, hijackings, and airplane and airport safety. In light of
recent events, Americans must not assume that terrorism occurs
only in the Middle East or is an outdated issue from the 1970s.
Although anti-American terrorist attacks around the world de-
clined by almost fifty percent since 1992, government officials
have warned American citizens that there are ominous signs that
terrorism will escalate in the future.3 In fact, in view of recent
events such as the World Trade Center bombing in New York,
the killing of two CIA employees in a Washington suburb, and
several airplane hijackings in 1993, Americans must be aware
that they are still the targets of choice for terrorists.4
In addition to the safety threat posed by foreign "bullies" who
cowardly endanger American lives, American travelers also face
the possibility that the aircraft they select may not meet minimal
safety standards. The Federal Aviation Administration has inves-
I Sanford L. Dow, Comment, Airport Security, Terrorism, and the Fourth Amend-
ment: 'A Look Back and a Step Forward, 58J. AIR L. & CoM. 1149, 1149 (1993).
2 Airline Deaths Above Average, FLIGHT INT'L, July 20, 1994, at 6. According to
the Flight International Airline Safety Review published the week ofJuly 20, 1994,
there is'a growing safety standard disparity between countries, with the most seri-
ous crashes involving Asian carriers. See also Lyndon McClain, Trend Towards Safer
Flying Upset by Recent Tragedies, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), Jan. 10, 1989, at 7 (reporting
that air crashes during the 1980s upset the long-term trend towards improved air
safety, which had leveled off in the 1970s).
3 See Robin Wright, U.S. Campaign Against Terrorism Begins to Show Results, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 11, 1995, at 14. The State Department reports that anti-American
attacks decreased from 142 incidents in 1992 to 66 in 1994. Id. International
terrorist acts have also dropped from 427 to 321 in 1994. Id.
4 See Alfred Borcover, Fear of Traveling? You Don't Have to Hunker in a Bunker,
CHI. TRiB., Feb. 3, 1991, at 2. A former State Department Office of Counter-
Terrorism official stated, "We are facing a very serious threat of international
terrorism that we probably haven't faced before .... We have now virtually every
leader of every Middle East terrorism organization pledging support to Saddam
Hussein, which suggests a concerted campaign against us and all those in the
alliance against Iraq." Id. See also Douglas Jehl, Iran-backed Terrorists Are Growing
More Aggressive, U.S. Warns, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1993, at A8 ("Iranian-backed mili-
tant groups have expanded their bases of support well beyond the Middle East
and represent the greatest threat."); Brian Jenkins, Picking up the Pieces: Trade
Center Bomb Shattered a Taboo, NEWSDAY, Mar. 24, 1993, at 93.
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tigated this issue for the last few years.5 In fact, a recent Clinton
Administration ban on nine foreign aircraft carriers who fail to
meet international safety standards highlights this issue.6
Several urgent matters must be addressed by American avia-
tion policy administrators, the federal government, and the
president. The most serious matter is the threat of terrorism.
The U.S. government's failure to adopt a coherent and effective
policy to combat the growing danger of terrorism and interna-
tional air-safety is a tragedy. The government, from Nixon to
Clinton, has addressed the problem in various ways. Some of
the initiatives include establishment of airport security check-
points, implementation of federal legislation, creation of task
forces that review programs, and use of military force. But these
governmental programs require improvement, and more action
must be taken.
This Comment traces the development of the U.S. response
to terrorism and international air safety, and suggests a unified
international effort as a possible solution. Part One presents a
historical overview of terrorism and international air safety, ex-
amining the regulatory framework of the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration and International Civil Aviation Administration.
Part Two looks at the progression of counterterrorist policies
beginning with an overview of the most recent presidential ad-
ministrations. Lastly, Part Three shifts to specific counterter-
rorist initiatives and an identification of recommendations.
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL
AIR SAFETY
The year 1968 is widely recognized as the beginning of the
modern era of international terrorism.7 This new era was
ushered in by a wave of aerial hijackings, bombings, kidnap-
5 Robert Trautman, Many Foreign Airlines Fail to Meet Safety Standard, U.S. Offi-
cial Says, J. COM., June 23, 1994, at B2. Since 1992, the FAA has been assessing
the safety standards of airlines from 90 nations that fly into the United States. Id.
6 See Lisa Burgess, DOT Lists Foreign Airlines Deemed'Unsafe, J. CoM., Sept. 6,
1994, at B2.
7 SeeJErrREv D. SIMON, THE TERRORIST TRAP 97 (1994); Grant Wardlaw, State
Response to International Terrorism Some Cautionary Comments, in CURRNT PERSPEC-
TWES ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 206-07 (Robert 0. Slater & Michael Stohl
eds., 1988); see also LEONARD B. WEINBERG & PAUL B. DAVIs, INTRODUCTION TO
POLITICAL TERRORiSM 38-39 (1989); Rushworth M. Kidder, Why Modern Terrorism?
Three Causes Springing from the Seeds of the 1960s, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM-
CHARACTERISTICS, CAUSES, CNTROLS 135-36 (Charles W. Kegley, Jr. ed., 1990).
Kidder cites Professor Paul Wilkinson of the University of Aberdeen, an interna-
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pings, assassinations and murders which shocked the nation and
the world.8 Hijacking became one of the most serious threats to
international and domestic air safety. As a result of the techno-
logical advances of the early 1970s which introduced the rise in
American air travel, the United States began to seriously address
the issue of hijackings and 'international air safety.9
A. FEDERAL AvIATION ADMINISTRATION
In the United States, the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) is responsible for promoting safe air travel and enforcing
security measures affecting aircraft and air terminals. 10 The
FAA works under the authority of the Department -of Transpor-
tation. Congress mandated the FAA to "carry out... [the] du-
ties and powers of the [DOT] Secretary related to aviation
tionally recognized authority on terrorism, who identifies the history-making
events of 1968:
(1) Three armed members of the Popular Front for the Liberation
of Palestine seized an El Al airliner and forced it to fly to Algeria-
launching a campaign of air piracy that has been a hallmark of
terrorism ever since; (2) [i]n West Germany, the Baader-Meinhof
gang gained prominence by torching a Frankfurt department store;
(3) [i]n Egypt, the Palestine Liberation Organization, sobered by
Israel's victory in the "six-day war" in 1967, made Yasser Arafat its
leader; (4) [i]n the United States, Martin Luther King, Jr. was assas-
sinated, unleashing a spate of domestic violence by groups such as
the Black Panthers and Weathermen; [and] (5) (i]n Mexico City,
street marches culminated in protests at the Olympic Games, aid-
ing growth of a terrorist movement with Cuban and Soviet
connections.
d. The lack of a generally accepted definition of "terrorism" has only added to
the problem of establishing a cohesive international and national strategy for
eliminating the terrorist threat. A study completed in 1983 reported the exist-
ence of more than 100 separate definitions by various analysts and scholars. See
David C. Rappoport, Fear and Trem4ling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions, 3
AM. POL. Sci. REv. 658-77 (1984).
8 See Wardlaw, supra note 7, at 206-07; see also Dow, supra note 1, at 1151 (iden-
tif-ying the first recorded American aircraft hijacking in 1961 and a decline in the
number of hijackings of American commercial airplanes during the period be-
tween 1961 and 1967).
9 The 1970s witnessed a number of technological factors that affected interna-
tional aviation security: (1) live television became the "stage" for terrorist de-
mands; (2) increased air travel throughout the world provided an easy target for
terrorists (in 1969 there were 33 hijackings of U.S. aircraft, compared to 16 be-
tween .1930 and 1968); and (3) weapons became very sophisticated and ad-
vanced. See KIDDER, supra note 7, at 137.
10 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 103(a), 72 Stat. 731.
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safety."11 The FAA has "exclusive responsibility for the direction
of any law.enforcement activity affecting the safety of persons
aboard aircraft in flight." 2
The FAA's security department is the regulatory arm of the
government's counterterrorist program. Since its inception, it
has focused on identifying security threats involving aircraft
piracy, " prescribing security requirements for airlines, aircraft,
and airports, and providing technical assistance regarding these
measures.' 4 In 1961, the FAA's programs were given a major
legislative push.
1961 marked the year of the first federal legislation address-
ing aircraft hijacking.15 Later that year, the Federal Aviation Act
of 1958 was amended to punish "aircraft piracy" offenders.' 6 By
1968, hijacking episodes had become a major problem for the
United States and its citizens.' 7 In response, the government
called on a special task force of the FAA to develop a method for
detecting individuals attempting to board aircraft with con-
cealed weapons.1 8 Despite ongoing protest and debate, 19 the
1 Theodore E. Rokita, Why U.S.-Enforced International flight Suspension Due to
Deficient Foreign Airport Security Should Be a NO-GO, 5 IND. INT'L & COMp. L. REv.
205, 212 (1994) (citing 49 U.S.C. § 106(a) (1994)).
12 ALONA E. EvANs & JOHN F. MuRPHY, LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TER-
RORISM 10 (1978).
13 Aircraft piracy is the umbrella term for aircraft hijackings, bomb threats at
airports, and interference with flight crew. See EDWARD MCWHINNEY, AERIAL
PIRACY AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: THE ILLEGAL DIVERSION OF AIRCRAFT AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 5-6 (1987) (defining piracy under international law).
14 William M. Carley, Airline Safety: The Price of Security, in TERRORISM AND POLI-
TICS 67 (Barry Rubin ed., 1990).
15 Act of Sept. 5, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-197, §§ (i)-(h), 75 Stat. 466 (current
version at 49 U.S.C. § 1472(i)-(m),(o) (1988)).
16 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1557 (1988). This act made aircraft piracy a crime
punishable by death or imprisonment and also identified a lesser offense of "in-
terference with flight crew or cabin crew," punishable by a monetary fine or im-
prisonment. See Humphrey G. Dawson, Civil Aviation, Hijacking and International
Terrorism: An Historical and Legal Review, 15 INT'L Bus. LAw. 57, 60 (1987).
17 Dow, supra note 1, at 1159. In 1968, the United States was hit by eighteen
successful hijacking attempts on American aircraft. Id.
18 Id. at 1160-61. "The task force developed and implemented the first anti-
hijacking system which included: (1) notices to the general public, (2) the use of
a hijacker profile, (3) the use of magnometers to detect any metal objects on
passengers who met the profile, (4) interviews with selected passengers, and (5)
frisks or searches of suspected passengers." Id.
19 For a discussion of the Congressional debate regarding FAA baggage screen-
ing and security proposals, see Stephen P. Halbrook, Firearms, the Fourth Amend-
ment, and Air Carrier Security, 52 J. AIR L. & CoM. 585 (1987), and see Dow, supra
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FAA made the screening programs mandatory fixtures at Ameri-
can airports beginning in 1973.20
In 1974, the airline security problem escalated, prompting
Congress to pass two new statutes directed at the problem of
hijacking.2 1 The Anti-hijacking Act of 1974 identified a general
prohibition against carrying a concealed weapon on board air-
craft.22 The Air Transportation Security Act of 197423 author-
ized screening for weapons in carry-on baggage and required
that screening procedures be uniform for all airlines.
24
The FAA and the government's focus on preventive security
measures and deterrence continued in 1985. The focus, how-
ever, shifted to foreign air carriers and airports. The Foreign
Airport Security Act was signed into law on August 8, 1985.5
The Act expanded the DOT's and FAA's role in combatting air
piracy. Specifically, the Act mandated FAA assessment of for-
eign airport security procedures and the security procedures uti-
lized by foreign air carriers serving the United States.26 Prior to
this Act, the American government did not have any legal
grounds for either identifying high-risk foreign international
airports, or conveying information or warnings to users of such
dangerous facilities. Furthermore, the American government
had no procedures in force for correcting the problems. The
provisions of the Act were threefold: (1) the DOT Secretar peri-
odically was to assess the security programs at foreign airports;
(2) the DOT Secretary was to notify foreign governments oper-
ating the airports of any failure to maintain or administer effec-
tive security measures; and (3) sanctions could be imposed in
the event the foreign government did not remedy the security
note 1, for a related discussion on how the government's proposed security meth-
ods impact on Fourth Amendment rights.
20 EvANs & MuRPHY, supra note 12, at 10.
21 Halbrook, supra note 19, at 604-10.
22 Id. at 608. The Act was also enacted to implement the Hague Convention.
See H.R. Rep. No. 885, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1974). See also The Convention for
the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, done Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T.
1641, 10 I.L.M. 133 [hereinafter Hague Convention]; text accompanying note 36
infra. .
23 49U.S.C. app. §§ 1356-58 (1988) (repealed 1994).
24 Id. § 1357(a) (2) (c).
25 Foreign Airport Security Act, Pub. L. No. 99-83, § 551, 99 Stat. 190, 222
(1985) (signed into law as part of the International Security and Development
Cooperation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-83) (amending § 1115 of the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1515).
26 See Rokita, supra note 11, at 217-18.
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deficiency.27 Although these statutes were repealed, later legis-
lative efforts and FAA initiatives continued and will be addressed
at length in the next section.
B. INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AvIATION ORGANIZATION
Reference has been made to the evolution of U.S. legislation
and programs relative to the control of aircraft hijacking. Inter-
national air safety and terrorism has been a nagging concern of
the international community.
The United Nations (UN) and its specialized agencies such as
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) have
worked to eradicate the terrorist threat on international avia-
tion. Conventions and protocols have been adopted regarding
hijacking -of aircraft and terrorist attacks on international air-
ports. The efforts of the international community help focus
needed attention on the problem. Nevertheless, the true result
has been a lack of consensus and effective concerted action
aimed at eliminating terrorist attacks.
Fifty years ago, the participants at the Chicago International
Aviation Convention established the principal objectives of the
ICAO:28 "The Chicago Convention was designed to ensure safe
and orderly growth of international civil aviation throughout
the world and to promote safety of flight in international air
navigation."29 ICAO has developed international measures for
controlling attacks on civil aviation. "The Tokyo, Hague, and
Montreal conventions constitute the basic international law re-
27 Dante B. Fascell, Combatting International Terrorism: The Role of Congress, 16
GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 655, 663-64 (1986).
28 The International Civil Aviation Organization was established in 1944 when
delegates from 52 nations gathered in Chicago to sign the Convention on Inter-
national Civil Aviation. The ICAO, as an arm of the United Nations, identifies its
goals and objectives as follows: to "develop the principles and techniques of in-
ternational air navigation, and to foster the planning and development of inter-
national air transport." NICOLAS M. MATTE, TREATISE ON AIR-AERONAUTIcAL LAw
187 (1981).
29 Id. Paul Sheppard & Eugene Sochor, Setting International Aviation Security
Standards, in AERIAL PIRACY AND AVIATION SECURITY 3 (Y6nah Alexander & Eu-
gene Sochor eds., 1990). The Chicago Convention also identifies two other
objectives of the ICAO:
1) It]hat ICAO promotes safety of flight in international aviation;
2) [t]hat ICAO, through the development of its Standards and
Practices, meets the needs of the peoples of the world for safe, reg-
ular, efficient, and economical air transport.
R I. R. Abeyratne, The Effects of Unlawful Interference with Civil Aviation on World
Peace and the Social Order, 22 TRANsp. L. J. 449, 486 (1995).
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lating to the facilitation of unlawfully interrupted flights, the of-
fense of hijacking, and the offense of sabotage of aircraft,
respectively." 30
The Tokyo Convention" was the first international treaty to
address hijacking. 32 Its provisions dealt primarily with jurisdic-
tion over offenses committed on board aircraft in flight. 3
Although the Tokyo Convention attempted to deal with hijack-
ings, it has nevertheless been criticized.34 The main criticisms
involved its failure to list any offenses that state parties are re-
quired to suppress and to impose any obligations involving the
prosecution or extradition of offenders.35
30 EVANS & MURPHY, supra note 12, at 20.
31 The Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board
Aircraft, 14 Sept. 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S 219 [hereinafter Tokyo
Convention].
32 JOSEPH J. LAMBERT, TERRORISM AND HOSTAGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw-A
COMMENTARY IN THE HOSTAGES CONVENTION 1979, 51 (1990).
The original purpose of the diplomatic negotiations which led up
to the Tokyo Convention was to try to define the legal status of
aircraft and to establish both judicial jurisdiction and also the appli-
cable substantive law to govern alleged offenses committed on
board aircraft in flight; and even to establish the legal powers of the
aircraft commander over the aircraft and its aircrew and passengers
while in flight.... The new proposals advanced in 1962 were to the
effect that State of first landing of a hijacked aircraft should restore
control of the aircraft to its commander and to take custody of the
hijackers; that the State of first landing of the hijacked aircraft
should permit the aircraft and its aircrew and passengers to con-
tinue on their journey as soon as practicable. These provisions [be-
came] Article 11 of the Tokyo Convention of 1963.
MCWHINNEY, supra note 13, at 36.
The provisions of the Tokyo Convention [specifically addressing]
the problem of aerial hijacking are contained in Article 11 ("Un-
lawful Seizure of Aircraft"):
ARTICLE 11. (1) When a person on board has unlawfully commit-
ted by force or threat thereof an act of interference, seizure, or
other wrongful exercise of control of an aircraft in flight or when
such an act is about to be committed, Contracting States shall take
all appropriate measures to restore control of the aircraft to its law-
ful commander or to preserve his control of the aircraft.
(2) In the cases contemplated in the preceding paragraph, the
Contracting State in which the aircraft lands shall permit its passen-
gers and crew to continue their journey as soon as practicable and
shall return the aircraft and its cargo to the persons lawfully end-
fled to possession.
Id. at 37-38.




The Hague Convention, 6 which followed, defined the offense
of unlawful seizure of aircraft:
Any person who on board an aircraft in flight: (a) Unlawfully, by
force or threat thereof, or by any other form of intimidation,
seizes, or exercises control of that aircraft, or attempts to per-
form any such act, or (b) is an accomplice of a person who per-
forms or attempts to perform any such act commits an offence
37
The Hague Convention falters on several points: it imposes pen-
alties without identifying or defining what these penalties
should be; the geographic limitations contained in article 1 con-
flict with the punitive measures outlined in the overall conven-
tion; and it sets out a confusing jurisdictional scheme. 8
The best attempt to control the international hijacking prob-
lem was the Montreal Convention, signed into law in 1971.39
The Convention was an ambitious attempt at controlling and
preventing the terrorist incidents affecting international avia-
tion. Nevertheless, there are still gaps in the counterterrorist
attack:
36 Hague Convention, supra note 22.
37 Id. at art. 1.
8 Abeyratne, supra note 30, at 487.
39 The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Civil Aviation, 23 Sept. 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, 974 U.N.T.S. 177 [hereinafter Mon-
treal Convention]. The Montreal Convention was directed at preventing sabo-
tage and other acts of general violence directed against aircraft. Its purpose was
to supplement the specific hijacking prohibitions and protective controls of the
Hague Convention. As a result of the increased success in the detection and
prevention of air piracy, the offenders began employing alternative methods and
became more difficult to apprehend. MCWHINNEY, supra note 13, at 45. The
definition of the offense of "Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation" is
found in Article 1:
Any person commits an offence if he unlawfully and intentionally:
(a) performs an act of violence against a person on board an air-
craft in flight if that act is likely to endanger the safety of that air-
craft; or (b) destroys an aircraft in service or causes damage to such
an aircraft which renders it incapable of flight or which is likely to
endanger its safety in flight; or (c) places or causes to be placed on
an aircraft in service, by any means whatsoever, a device or sub-
stance which is likely to destroy that aircraft, or to cause damage to.
it which renders it incapable of flight, or to cause damage to it
which is likely to endanger its safety in flight; or (d) destroys or
damages air navigation facilities or interferes with their operation,
if any such act is likely to endanger the safety of aircraft in flight; or
(e) communicates information which he knows to be false, thereby
endangering the safety of an aircraft in flight.
Montreal Convention, supra, at art. 1.
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a) the conventions do not provide for and guarantee the trial of
an offender, and do not specify adequate punitive measures;
b) no obligation is cast on contracting states for the extradition
of an offender;
c) no provision is made for the universal adoption of standards
of precaution and safety; and
d) the initial attempt, albeit somewhat unsophisticated, of the
Tokyo Convention at a remedial approach has been thwarted by
the repressive attitude of the two subsequent conventions. °
III. THE PRESIDENTIAL RESPONSE
A. NIXON
Nixon's administration was the first to address the issue of ter-
rorism seriously. The first U.S. government program to combat
terrorism was introduced in response to the massacre at the
Olympic Village in Munich, Germany in 1972.41 Following the
aftermath of the Munich massacre, the Nixon Administration
created the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism.42 The
committee met for the first and only time on October 2, 1972.
Membership included the secretaries of state, treasury, defense,
and transportation; the attorney general; the director of the
CIA; the national security advisor; and the acting director of the
FBI. The committee's main task involved the coordination of
federal agencies to combat terrorism. 43 Additionally, the com-
mittee decided to encourage international cooperation in the
40 Abeyratne, supra note 29, at 487-88.
41 The massacre at the Olympic Village in Munich occurred during the 1972
Olympic Games. Eight members of the Black September Organization-a Pales-
tinian extremist group-killed seventeen people, including eleven Israeli ath-
letes, one policeman, and five of their own group. This tragic event came on the
heels of a series of hijackings and terrorist activities. The dawn of technology
ensured that the events were broadcast throughout the world on television. See
Simon, supra note 7, at 106-07; William R. Farrell, Organized to Combat Terrorism,
in FIGHTING BACK 50, 51 (Neil C. Livingston & Terrell E. Arnold eds., 1987).
42 President Nixon Establishes Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism, U.S. DEP'T ST.
BULL., Oct. 23, 1972 (hereinafter BULLETIN]; see WILLIAM R. FARRELL, THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO TERRORISM: IN SEARCH OF AN EFFECTIVE STRATEGY 32
(1982); SIMON, supra note 7, at 107.
43 More specifically the Committee was to:
(1) Coordinate, among the government agencies, ongoing activity
for the prevention of terrorism. This will include such activities as
the collection of intelligence world wide and the physical protec-
tion of U.S. personnel and installations abroad and foreign diplo-
mats and diplomatic installations in the United States.
(2) Evaluate all such programs and activities and where necessary
.recommend methods for their effective implementation.
514
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fight against terrorism; one such plan involved providing new
initiatives for the ICAO:;
Unfortunately, as often happens with governmental initia-
tives, the committee was a bureaucratic failure. Most of the
committee work was done by the Working Group on Terrorism,
comprised of senior representatives from each of the agencies
represented on the committee. 45 Some of the problems ham-
pering the working group involved the size of the group, the
failure of agencies and departments to exchange information,
and various individuals' wavering interest in pursuing the origi-
nal goals.46
B. CARTER
The Carter era began with a complete revamping of the insti-
tutional machinery organized to respond to terrorism. The
changes came about as a result of an extensive review of U.S.
Government policy and capabilities with regard to the problem
of responding to and combatting terrorism. 47 The review, or-
dered by the National Security Council (NSC), prompted the
issuance of Presidential Review Memorandum 30 (PRM-30),48
which recommended a number of changes to the U.S.
counterterrorism program. A tri-level organizational structure
was introduced in conjunction with four basic program compo-
nents: prevention, deterrence, reaction, and prediction.4 9
The Carter memorandum (PRM-30) abolished the Nixon
Cabinet Committee, replacing it with a Special Coordination
Committee (SCC) of the NSC.50 The SCC functioned under the
leadership of the Assistant to the President for National Security
(3) Devise procedures for reacting swiftly and effectively to acts of
terrorism that occur.
(4) Make recommendations to the Director of the Office of Man-
agement and Budget concerning proposed funding of such
programs.
(5) Report to the President, from time to time, concerning the
foregoing.
FARRELL, supra note 42, at 32-33; see also id. at 33-34 (explaining the eleven-step
government policy for dealing with the international aspects of terrorism).
4 Id. at 33.
45 See MARC A. CELMER, TERRORISM, U.S. STRATEGY, AND REAGAN POLICIES 18
(1987).
46 Id.
47 Id. at 19; FARRELL, supra note 42, at 35.
48 FARRELL, supra note 42, at 35.
49 Id. at 34-35.
50 Id. at 35.
1995-1996]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
Affairs. The SCC operated as a policy-directing body as well as
an advisory body, and engaged in three main functions: (1) su-
pervision and coordination of senior-level interagency groups
dealing with terrorism; (2) resolution of any jurisdictional
problems that might surface during a terrorist situation; and (3)
ensuring that all necessary decisions concerning terrorism were
made at the highest levels of government. 1
President Carter's administration became the first to falter
under the political game associated with fighting international
terrorism.5 2 Ultimately Carter's downfall, the event that de-
stroyed his presidency, involved a terrorist crisis.5 On Novem-
ber 4, 1979, a group of militants seized the U.S. embassy in
Tehran and held Americans hostage for 444 days.5 4 The hos-
tage crisis was an opportunity for Carter's administration to util-
ize the thirty organizations comprising the government's
antiterrorism structure.5 Unfortunately, the organizational
structure would not prove effective, as a number of factors
worked to exacerbate the situation. First, Carter's patient,
nonforceful approach allowed the Iranian government and mili-
tants the perfect opportunity to manipulate the President and
his administration. 6 Second, the television age made it possible
for terrorists to depend on the media to convey their political
motives, threats to the government, and hostage-related
demands.57
Eventually Carter left office with a painful reminder of how
the United States could be manipulated by foreign terrorists
who knew how to play the terrorism game.58 Carter's revamping
of the government's counter-terrorist organizational structure
remained intact through Reagan's presidency.59 Yet, the patient
approach to international terrorism would be replaced in the
5 An Act to Combat International Terrorism: Hearings on S. 2236 Before the Senate
Comm. on Government Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1978).
52 CELMER, supra note 45, at 20.
53 Id. at 22-23; see also SIMON, supra note 7, at 121.
54 See SIMON, supra note 7, at 125-66. The author points out that the legacy of
the 1979-81 Iran hostage crisis became a lesson in the power of terrorism. Id. at
122. Without causing a single casualty to any American civilian (although eight
U.S. servicemen were killed), the Iranian government, militants and others in
post-revolutionary Iran were able to orchestrate the longest and most agonizing
crisis for the United States in the, Post-World War II era. Id.
55 CELMER, supra note 45, at 20.
56 SIMON, supra note 7, at 121-66.
57 Id. at 269.
58 Id. at 121.
59 CELMER, supra note 45, at 23.
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Reagan Administration by an approach that treated terrorism as
an act of war.60
C. REAGAN
The Reagan Administration came to office in 1981, on the
heels of the Iranian hostage crisis, with tough new rhetoric con-
cerning terrorism. 61 President Reagan immediately made ef-
forts to combat terrorism a top priority for his administration.
During his first term, there were few substantive initiatives,
either legislative or administrative, addressing the issue of ter-
rorism. But, beginning in 1983, a number of unprecedented
attacks on U.S. diplomatic facilities and military installations in
the Middle East occurred, bringing the issue of terrorism back
to the forefront of American politics. 62
On October 23, 1983, Iranian-backed Shi'ite terrorists
bombed the headquarters of the U.S. Marine peace-keeping
force in Beirut. Following the terrorist bombing that killed 246
Marines,63 the Reagan Administration began strengthening its
intelligence agencies and developing its proactive response to
terrorism.64
In response to the bombing in Beirut, the Pentagon estab-
lished the Long Commission to investigate the U.S. anti-terrorist
policy.65 The Long Commission's most important and lasting
legacy was its message that "terrorism had become tantamount
60 SIMON, supra note 7, at 166.
61 Id. at 166-67. President Reagan greeted the hostages, who were freed a few
moments after he was sworn in as president, with the following remark which
reflected how his administration would approach the issue of international ter-
rorism: "let terrorists beware that when the rules of international behavior are
violated, our policy will be one of swift and effective retribution." Id. at 167.
62 JOHN B. WOLF, ANTITERRORIST INITIATIVES 55 (1989).
63 For a discussion of the terrorist attacks against the United States in Lebanon
in 1983, see NEIL LIVINGSTONE & DAVID HALEVY, INSIDE THE PLO: COVERT UNITS,
SECRET FUND AND THE WAR AGAINST ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES 265-67
(1990).
64 WOLF, supra note 62, at 56. The author explains,
The Department of Defense (D.O.D) formed three new antiter-
rorist organizations. The United States Navy's Antiterrorist Indica-
tion and Warning Alert Center, which is one of these new groups,
was formed on December 19, 1984, and assigned the mission of
gathering antiterrorist information from domestic and foreign
sources and distributing a finished product. Often, its report is a
specially tailored terrorist-threat assessment, released to designated
U.S. Navy and Marine commanders.
Id.
65 Id. at 57.
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to an act of war."66 Headed by retired Admiral RobertJ. Long,
the Commission called on the U.S. government to activate a
strong, active counterterrorist policy.
67
A few months after the Long Commission report, President
Reagan introduced important counterterrorist legislation. On
April 3, 1984, he signed National Security Decision Directive 138
(NSDD 138).68 This document officially established the Ameri-
can government policy for the use of military force against ter-
rorists. 69 The still classified document identifies the chief
themes under the NSDD 138:
No nation can condone terrorism.
Every country has the right to defend itself.
Terrorism is a problem for all nations.
The United States will work with other governments to deal with
terrorism. U.S. policy aims to deal with all forms of terrorism but
regards state terrorism as a special problem.
States that use or support terrorism cannot be allowed to do so
without consequences.
The United States will use all available channels to dissuade states
from supporting terrorism.
The United States will heighten its efforts to prevent attacks and
to warn and protect its citizens and allies.
The United States will seek to hold acts of state terrorism up to
the strongest public condemnation.
When these efforts fail, the United States has a right to defend
itself.70
The signing of NSDD 138 signified a shift in the U.S. response
to terrorism.71 It detailed the "Reagan administration's desire to
deter and prevent terrorism through the use of more unilateral
methods ... [than] used by past administrations. '72 From the
early 1970s until the spring of 1984, the U.S. response to terror-
6 Id. at 56.
67 Id. at 56-57; see also SIMON, supra note 7, at 178 n.28 (quoting the Commis-
sion's message).
68 Neil C. Livingstone, Proactive Responses to Terrorism: Reprisals, Preemption and
Retributions, in FIGHTING BACK, supra note 41, at 109, 112.
69 SIMON, supra note 7, at 179.
70 Livingstone, supra note 68, at 112-13.
71 See id. at 113. The author notes that another element of the directive was its
reference to article 51 of the U.N. Charter, identifying states' rights of self-de-
fense in fighting terrorism. The United States was actively promulgating its
proactive counterterrorist policy. The NSDD served to warn terrorists that the
United States would no longer passively submit to terrorist outrages without en-
gaging in military action to defend its citizens and punish terrorist bullies. Id.
72 CELMER, supra note 45, at 63.
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ism was based on a passive, reactive and patient defense. During
Reagan's term in office, the focus shifted to a "no compromise"
and very proactive approach (although some commentators will
argue this is not an accurate evaluation of the Reagan Adminis-
tration) . Clearly, at the end of his first term, President Reagan
had placed international terrorism at the top of his foreign pol-
icy agenda. The remaining years of Reagan's term would allow
the President the opportunity to test his proactive strength.
On April 26, 1984, President Reagan submitted several legisla-
tive proposals to Congress. 4 He requested enactments of the
following: enabling legislation for the Convention Against the
Taking of Hostages adopted by the United Nations on Decem-
ber 17, 1979;75 enabling legislation for the Convention on Sup-
pression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation,
adopted by the ICAO on September 23, 1971 in Montreal;76 au-
thority to pay rewards for information concerning international
terrorist acts; 77 and final authority to prohibit the training or
support of international terrorist organizations. 78 The legisla-
tive response was positive. Congress approved legislation au-
thorizing increased security of American diplomats abroad, the
payment of rewards for information on international terrorist
acts, and danger pay for U.S. personnel serving in high threat
posts.
79
73 See Livingstone, supra note 68, at 113-19; SIMON, supra note 7, at 167-217. In
fact, both authors identify Secretary of State Shultz as being the most outspoken,
"rhetoric-driven" member of Reagan's administration. Livingstone, supra, at 114-
15; SIMON, supra, at 167-217. Simon explains that a speech by Shultz before the
Park Avenue Synagogue in New York City "set off alarm bells in Washington." Id.
at 181-82. Throughout Reagan's administration, Shultz publicly campaigned for
a bold policy to combat terrorism.
74 President's Message to the Congress Transmitting Four Proposed Bills, 20
WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 590, 591 (Apr. 26, 1984) [hereinafter President's
Message].
75 Legislation to Combat International Terrorism: 98th Congress Hearings and Markup
Before the Comm. on Foreign Affairs and its Subcomms. on International Security and
Scientific Affairs and on International Operations, House of Representatives, 98th Cong.,
1st & 2d Sess. 193 (1984) [hereinafter Legislation Hearings].
76 President's Message, supra note 74, at 592; Legislation Hearings, supra note 75,
at 197.
77 President's Message, supra note 74, at 592; Legislation Hearings, supra note 75,
at 214.
78 President's Message, supra note 74, at 593; Legislation Hearings, supra note 75,
at 206. For an overview of the bills, see Marian N. Leich, Four Bills Proposed by
President Reagan to Counter Terrorism, 78 AM.J. INT'L L. 915 (1984).
79 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism, Pub. L. No. 98-533, 98 Stat.
2706 (1984).
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During 1985, the Committee on Foreign Affairs addressed in-
ternational terrorism within the context of its authorization and
oversight of the International Security and Development Coop-
eration Act of 19850 and the Department of State Authorization
Act of 1985.1 The committee undertook three legislative initia-
tives that helped impact bilateral and multilateral responses to
international terrorism: the Foreign Airport Security Act of
1985;2 the International Maritime and Port Security Act of
1986;8s and the Omnibus Diplomatic Securityand Antiterrorism
Act of 1986.84 Responding to a number of international terror-
ist incidents in 1985,85 the United States implemented a number
of security improvements at international airports. Congress en-
acted the Foreign Airport Security Act8 6 which addresses the in-
creasing number of terrorist acts targeted at U.S. citizens
traveling via foreign airports. Additionally, the Foreign Airport
Security Act addresses the international aviation industry's con-
cern with terrorist acts committed at international airports. The
House Committees on Foreign Affairs and Public Works and
Transportation concluded that no formal mechanisms existed
in the U.S. government for identifying international airports
having a serious risk, for informing the public of those risks, or
for taking the necessary preventive measures to avoid security
80 International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, Pub. L.
No 99-83, 99 Stat. 190 (1985).
81 Department of State Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1984 and 1985, Pub. L.
No. 98-164, 97 Stat. 1017 (1983), as amended by Pub. L. No. 99-93, 99 Stat. 405
(1985).
82 International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, Pub. L.
No. 99-83, tit, 5, 99 Stat. 190, 219-27 (1985) [hereinafter Foreign Airport Security
Act].
83 Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
399, tit. 9, 100 Stat. 853, 889-93 (1986) [hereinafter Omnibus Act].
84 Id. at 190.
85 See, e.g., Joseph Berger, Gunmen SeizeJet in Mideast Flight; Passenger Killed, N.Y.
TIMES, June 15, 1985, at Al; R. W. Apple,Jr., 329 Lost on Air-India Plane After Crash
Near Ireland; Bomb is Suspected as Cause, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1985, at Al; Christo-
pher S. Wren, Blast Kills 2 as Cargo is Unloaded from Canadian Airline in Japan, N.Y.
TIMES, June 24, 1985, at Al.
86 Foreign Airport Security Act, supra note 82.
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problems.8 7 The Foreign Airport Security Act establishes guide-
lines for dealing with these problem areas.88
In the spring of 1985, the Committee on Foreign Affairs en-
gaged in extensive hearings involving the implementation of the
Foreign Airport Security Act.89 In addition, the Committee's
Staff Task Force on International Terrorism and Diplomatic Se-
curity conducted two investigative trips to review the adequacy
of foreign airport security at high-risk foreign airports in Rome,
Frankfurt, London, and Athens.90 As a result of this oversight
activity, the Staff Task Force concluded that, to ensure a univer-
sally high level of security at foreign international airports, for-
eign flag carriers should establish security procedures equivalent
to the standards required of U.S. carriers under the Foreign Air-
port Security Act. 1
The important legislation introduced during the Reagan Ad-
ministration did not conclude with the passage of the Foreign
Airport Security Act. In conjunction with that Act, Congress en-
acted the Anti-Terrorism Training Assistance. Program.92 This
program provided Congress with additional funding for upgrad-
ing security at international airports, specifically in the areas of
training and equipment identified in the Foreign Airport Secur-
ity Act.93 Also, in 1984, the Hostage Taking Act94 was enacted to
87 International Terrorism: 1985 Hearings and Markup on H.R. 2822 Before the
Comm. on Foreign Affairs and its Subcomms. on Arms Control, International Security and
Science and on International Operations, House of Representatives, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
141-42 (1985) [hereinafter International Terrorism Hearings].
88 A few of the specific mandates include: (1) the Secretary of Transportation,
through the Federal Aviation Administration, is to conduct periodic security as-
sessments of foreign international airports used by United States carriers, and (2)
the Secretary of State is to seek multilateral and bilateral agreements to
strengthen enforcement measures and standards for compliance with respect to
aircraft sabotage, aircraft hijacking, and airport security. See Foreign Airport Se-
curity Act, supra note 82, § 551.
89 See International Terrorism Hearings, supra note 87.
90 See Antiterrorism Measures: The Adequacy of Foreign Airport Security, Staff Report to
the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2
(1986) [hereinafter Staff Report].
91 Id. at 6.
92 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424 (1961),
amended ly Pub. L. No. 98-151, 97 Stat. 964, 972 (1983).
93 Foreign Airport Security Act, supra note 82, § 501.
94 Act for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Hostage-Taking,
Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch. XX, 98 Stat. 2186 (1984) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1203 (1994)) (upholding jurisdiction over terrorists who seize or detain
a national of the United States).
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remedy specific problems of terrorism that pose the greatest
threats to American citizens.95
In 1986, the American people were introduced to a new wave
of counterterrorist legislation. After approval of the Foreign
Airport Security Act in 1985, the Committee on Foreign Affairs
undertook further hearings which culminated in the approval of
the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of
1986. this Act contained two Committee initiatives, the Inter-
national Maritime and Port Security Act,96 and the establish-
ment of an international coordinating committee on
antiterrorism. 97 Lastly, the United States government had be-
come frustrated with its inability to prosecute terrorists and thus
passed the Terrorist Prosecution Act on February 19, 1986.98
The bill "provide [s] for the prosecution and punishment of per-
sons who, in furtherance of terrorist activities or because of the
nationality of the victims, commit violent attacks upon Ameri-
cans outside the United States or conspire outside of the United
States to murder Americans within the United States." 99
Although Reagan did not leave office unscathed by contro-
versy, '00 he was able to leave feeling proud of some of his accom-
plishments involving his battle against international terrorism.
He was the first president since Jefferson to use military force in
his counterterrorist initiatives and policy.101 Although he fo-
cused on the United States' unilateral counterterrorist efforts,
he urged American allies to join together in their efforts to stop
the terrorist threat.'0 2 President Reagan also increased security
95 Id.
96 Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 99-399,
100 Stat. 853 (1986), 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at tit. IX. This act resulted from the
response to the Achille Lauro ship hijacking. See generally STEVEN LIVINGSTON,
THE TERRORISM SPECTACLE 30 (1994). The Achille Lauro hijacking of October
1985 involved Abu Abbas's Palestinian Liberation Front. This group hijacked an
Italian cruise ship with eighty passengers on board. An elderly American passen-
ger was one of the casualties. Id.
97 The purpose of this initiative was to establish a coordinating committee fo-
cusing the attention of like-minded governments on the problems and necessary
responses to international terrorism. Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiter-
rorism Act, supra note 96, § 701(b).
98 S. 1429, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REc. S1382-88 (daily ed. Feb. 19,
1986). This bill passed the Senate by a vote of 92 to zero. Id.
99 Id. § 2331 (f).
100 The Iran-Contra affair involving the Reagan Administration's "arms for hos-
tages" deal ruined the political careers of many high-ranking Reagan Administra-
tion officials.
101 SIMON, supra note 7, at 215.
102 Id. at 215.
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measures at U.S. installations abroad, and diligently worked to
bring terrorists to justice in American courts.10 3
D. BUSH
President Bush's administration would also face a major ter-
rorist tragedy with the bombing of Pam Am Flight 103. Unlike
terrorist crises during prior administrations, this, event involved
a direct terrorist attack on a major American air carrier. The
U.S. aviation industry would never be the same.
Pan Am Flight 103 began its journey in Frankfurt, Germany,
changed, aircraft at London's Heathrow airport, then departed
for New York. The plane was loaded with aviation fuel, 259 pas-
sengers and crew, and twenty tons of cargo. Only thirty-nine
minutes after departing Heathrow airport, at an altitude of
31,000 feet, the plane was destroyed. The news spread quickly
and shocked the world. Pan Am Flight 103 was the deadliest
aviation incident in American history. 10 4 The tragedy triggered
the proposal of several bills that attempted to improve interna-
tional air safety for American travelers. 10 5
The Pan Am Flight 103 bombing prompted the government
to take a closer look at airport security and airline bomb detec-
tion measures. Only a few months after the tragedy, two avia-
tion security-related bills were introduced: the Airport
Technology and Research Act of 1989 (ATRA) 10 6 and the Avia-
tion Security Act of 1989.107 Shortly thereafter, President Bush
created the President's Commission on Aviation Security and
Terrorism to evaluate the government's. aviation security poli-
cies in general and with respect to the Pan Am disaster in partic-
ular.108 Following the Commission's report, delivered in May of
103 Id. at 216.
104 See Andrew Phillips, A Doomed Flight Home, MACLEAN'S, Jan. 2, 1989, at 46;
Adam Platt & Donna Foote, The Warnings That Weren't; New Revelations About the
Tragedy ofPan Am 103, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 27, 1989, at 30; NancyJ. Strantz, Aviation
Security and Pan Am Flight 103: What Have We Learned?, 56J. AIR L. & COM. 413,
414-15 (1990).
105 William M. Carley, Airline Safety: The Price of Security, inTERRORISM AND POLI-
TICS 65 (Barry Rubin ed., 1991).
106 Airport Security Technology and Research Act of 1989, H.R. 2365, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REc. H1975-03 (daily ed. May 16, 1989) [hereinafter
ATRA].
107 Aviation Security Act of 1989, H.R. 1659, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
108 NancyJ. Strantz, From Technology to Teamwork: Aviation Security Reform Since
Pan Am Flight 103, 3 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 235, 243 (1993).
Among its findings reported on May 15, 1990, the Commission asserted the
following:
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1990, President Bush signed the Aviation Security Improvement
Act of 1990 into law. 09 After the tragedy, the relatives of the
victims did not focus only on their grief.110 The "Victims of Pan
Am Flight 103," as the relatives of those killed came to be called,
were ordinary American citizens, but were able to organize into
various committees to oversee their lobbying efforts. 1 These
lobbying efforts proved quite successful as their demands for an
independent investigation of the disaster were largely responsi-
ble for President Bush's next move.
On August 4, 1989, Pxiesident Bush issued Executive Order
12,686, establishing the President's Commission on Aviation Se-
curity and Terrorism.1 2 The commission's function was to con-
duct a comprehensive study and appraisal of practices and
policy options with respect to preventing terrorist acts involving
aviation.' 1 3 The commission immediately began its work, which
included researching and investigating security measures in
place at airports in the United States and Europe, conducting
- Serious flaws exist in the civil aviation security system in the
United States.
- The system has failed to provide the proper level of protec-
tion for the traveling public.
- The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is a reactive
agency lacking adequate contingency planning to anticipate threats
against civil aviation.
- Pan American World Airways' apparent security lapses and
FAA's failure to enforce its own regulations followed a pattern that
existed for some time before the destruction of Pan Am flight 103.
Yonah Alexander, Introduction to AERIAL PIRACY AND AVIATION SECURITY ix-x
(Yonah Alexander & Eugene Sochor eds., 1990).
109 Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-604, 104 Stat.
3066 (1990) (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C. and 22 U.S.C.) [hereinaf-
ter Aviation Security Act].
10 See Wendy Giebler, Reclaiming the Skies from Terrorism: The Aviation Security
Improvement Act of 1990, 16 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 757, 758 (1992).
111 The group consisted of a board of directors which headed four committees,
including a legal committee to oversee legal matters (both criminal and civil lia-
bility); a political committee responsible for lobbying efforts; a financial commit-
tee which raised money; and an emotional support group. Id. at 765-66.
112 Exec. Order No. 12,686, 3 C.F.R. 232 (1989 compilation & parts 100-102,
1990) (established Aug. 4, 1989); see also 25 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 31 (White
House Statement on the establishment of the Commission); 135 CONG. REC.
S10,143-46 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1989) (statements of Sen. Mitchell, Sen. Dole &
Sen. Lautenberg).
113 Charter of the President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism.
See Exec. Order No. 12,686, supra note 112.
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hearings (most notably with the "Victims of Pan Am Flight
103"), and holding committee meetings." 4
The Commission eventually called for a sweeping overhaul of a
seriously flawed American aviation security system, charging the
government with failing to adequately protect the traveling pub-
lic from the threat of terrorist attack... at foreign and domestic
airports. In addition, the Commission called for dozens of steps
to combat terrorism aimed against civil aviation. A portion of the
Report focused on the aviation security system in general, and
pointed to the unique difficulties encountered by international
carriers. Specifically, there is no uniform international civil avia-
tion security system in place to assure a consistent level of secur-
ity for passengers. Although many nations have adopted the
standards of the ICAO, these standards only prescribe a mini-
mum level of security that is inadequate for "high-threat" interna-
tional airports. The Report identified the role of the FAA which
was created in 1958 and is responsible for ensuring air safety for
American travelers. In 1985, the FAA's role in aviation security
expanded significantly with the passage of the International Se-
curity and Development Cooperation Act. This Act requires the
FAA to assess security at foreign airports served by U.S. carriers,
and the security procedures of foreign air carriers flying to the
United States.'1 5
Another measure triggered by the Pan Am Flight 103 tragedy
was the Airport Technology and Research Act of 1989 (ATRA).
The stated purposes of ATRA were the following: "first, to sup-
port cost-effectiveness and operational feasibility evaluations of
alternative explosives detection systems for possible implementa-
tion at airports; and secondly, to promote accelerated research
and development of future explosives detection technologies for
use in airports."' 16 ATRA was a direct legislative response to the
bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 and drew additional support
from another incident, the bombing of the French UTA Flight
772 over Niger by extremist Shi'ite Moslems in mid-September
of 1989.117 The legislation reflected the realization that the
technology of terrorists had surpassed the ability of existing con-
ventional airport devices to detect weapons and explosives. For
1"4 See Giebler, supra note 110, at 782.
15 Id. at 782-83 (citations omitted).
116 Airport Security Technology and Research Act, supra note 106, § 2(b).
117 135 CONG. REc. H5761-04 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1989) (statements of Rep.
Clinger); 135 CONG. REc. E3147-02 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1989) (extensions of re-
marks of Rep. Borski); Eloise Salhoz et al., Terror at 30,000 Feet: Who Did the
Bombing, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 2, 1989, at 30.
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example, metal detectors and x-ray machines would be entirely
ineffective in detecting the Semtex plastic explosive used in the
Pan Am Flight 103 bomb. Whereas the Airport Security Act of
1990 was primarily directed toward developing a specific secur-
ity device, ATRA was concerned with providing funds for evalu-
ating the effectiveness and operati6nal feasibility of a variety of
new aviation detection systems.
The Bush Administration should be commended for swiftly
pushing the aviation security legislation through both houses of
Congress. The lessons from Pan Am Flight 103 are a reflection
of the courageous human spirit and effort of the "Victims of Pan
Am Flight 103." The legislation, specifically the Aviation Secur-
ity Improvement Act of 1990, was an excellent weapon in the
U.S. arsenal for combatting international terrorism and improv-
ing air safety. The focus on improving bomb detection at air-
ports and developing detection devices continued in the
Clinton Administration.
E. CLINTON
President Clinton's administration began almost twenty-four
years after Nixon's administration ushered in the "modem era
of terrorism." Some may ask what has been accomplished and
what has changed. Unfortunately, some of the players and their
weapons have changed.
The year 1992 can be characterized as a year of transition, not
only for Clinton, but for the entire international community
concerned with terrorist threats. The strong anti-terrorist rheto-
ric of the 1980s was waning. The Cold War was quickly fading
from the memories of most Americans, although the blood-shed
in Bosnia-Herzegovina reminded Americans that world conflict
was still festering. The last major terrorist attack against the
United States was the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103; but the
calm would soon change.
The 1993 World Trade Center Bombing brought Americans
back to reality about the terrorist threat. 118 The Trade Center
"a Brian Duffy et al., What Kind of Terror Network?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
July 5, 1993, at 26, (stating that bombing shattered any American complacency).
The planned bombing of the U.N. Building, a government office, and two New
York Tunnels was intended to send the message that the United States could be
the victim of a terrorist attack at any time. The message was well taken by the FBI
and State Department. It was apparent that the American borders were being
invaded by people who harbored undeniable hostility toward the United States.
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attack, when it occurred, was the worst terrorist incident ever to
take place on American soil. 119 The State Department re-
sponded to terrorist activities by issuing warnings to U.S. travel-
ers. 120 The warnings to American travelers within the United
States and internationally would continue for the next few years.
A rash of terrorists attacks, both domestic and international,
occurred in 1995.121 The Oklahoma City bombing occurred on
April 19, 1995 and arguably surpassed the magnitude of the
World Trade Center Bombing. The summer of 1995 saw the
nation's airports under the highest security alert since the Gulf
War as a result of threats by Islamic groups.1 22 Airport security
was also increased in some regions, as a result of the
Unabomber's threats to blow up an airline out of Los Ange-
les.12 3 Other news reports also identified security consultant
concerns regarding inadequate airport security measures.
124
The consultants pointed out that airlines do not have the tech-
nological capabilities to detect all explosives. Additionally, the
airlines fail to match bags on domestic flights, citing inconven-
ience problems for passengers. The security consultants also
119 Richard Bernstein, Four Found Guilty on all Counts in World Trade Center Bomb-
ing, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 5, 1994, at Al.
120 Tom Belden, Experts Downplay Risk of Terrorism to U.S. Travelers, ST. Louis
PosT-DisPATCH, July 12, 1993, at 20.
121 Some of the terrorist incidents from the first eight months of 1995 include:
A March 20 poisonous gas attack in the Tokyo subway system that killed 12 and
injured thousands. On April 19, the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building was
bombed, killing 168 people. Basque separatists are suspected of the April 19 car
bombing in Madrid that injured Spanish opposition leader Jose Maria Aznar.
The Shining Path is suspected in a May 24 car bombing that killed four people.
Members of an anti-government Islamic group in Malawi, Egypt allegedly killed
10 people in two separate shootings on June 3. A June 26 assassination attempt
in Cairo failed to injure Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. Six people were
killed and 33 injured when a bomb destroyed a commuter bus on July 24 in Tel,
Aviv. Seven people were killed and 97 injured by bombings in Paris on July 25
and August 17. Explosives, hidden in the luggage of a University of Florida pro-
fessor by Amsterdam police, arrived in Orlando on August 18. Five people, in-
cluding one American, were killed, and 100 injured, when a bomb destroyed a
commuter bus in Jerusalem on August 21. Georgian President Eduard
Shevardnadze suffered minor injuries when his motorcade was bombed in Thilisi,
Georgia on August 29. Editorial, Airport Security: Your Stake in It; Threats Are Genu-
ine-Precautions Not Hyped, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 3, 1995, at G3.
122 Pat Milton, Terror Threat Brings Tighter Security at Three N.Y Airports, ORANGE
CouNTY REGISTER, Aug. 15, 1995, at A13; NYC Airports under High Security, THE
TENNESSEAN, Aug. 14, 1995, at 1A.
123 Lori Sham, Security for Unabomber Stays Tight, USA TODAY, July 6, 1995, at Al.
124 Jonathan Dahl, Holes Remain in U.S. Airport Security, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21,
1995, at 4.
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called for the elimination of the present curbside baggage pro-
gram utilized by most of the nation's airports. The better
method for detecting terrorists, the. consultants explained, is to
have ticket agents who are trained to spot terrorists check in all
luggage. 125
The Clinton Administration responded to the ominous and
deadly terrorist threat around the world and passed sweeping
anti-terrorist legislation in 1995. The Omnibus Counter-Terror-
ism Act of 1995126 was the first legislative measure since the 1990
Aviation Security Act.12 7 The $2 billion dollar measure drafted
by the Senate passed by a vote of ninety-one to eight.12 8 Some of
the key provisions include:
- authorizes the hiring of 1000 new federal law enforcement
personnel;
- increases federal penalties for terrorist crimes as well as for
conspiracies involving explosives and creates a new death penalty
for terrorist murders;
- requires that tiny traceable materials, called taggants, be
placed in most chemicals that can be used to make bombs;
- expands use of "roving" wiretaps, which are applied to several
telephone lines used by the same suspect;
- allows the FBI access, through court orders, to credit reports,
.hotel records and telephone records in foreign cases;
- imposes a one-year limit for death-row inmates to appeal their
sentences in federal courts;
- establishes new procedures for deporting alleged terrorist
aliens;
- allows use of the military to aid civilian law enforcement in
cases involving chemical or biological weapons of mass destruc-
tion, in addition to its current permitted use in nuclear weapons
cases;
- bans fund-raising for foreign organizations designated as ter-
rorist by the Secretary of State;
- bans U.S. aid to countries that assist terrorist nations; and
- allows U.S. citizens to sue terrorist nations for personal inju-
ries caused by terrorist acts.12 9
125 Id.
126 S. 735, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). It is worth noting that President Clin-
ton did not propose this legislation following the World Trade Center bombing.
Nevertheless, he did introduce the legislation during his January 1995 State-of-
the-Union address months before the Oklahoma City bombing in April.
127 See Aviation Security Act, supra note 107.
128 Marcy Gordon, Senate Passes Anti-Terrorism Bill, THE COURIER J. (Louisville,
KY), June 8, 1995, at 5A.
129 Id.
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President Clinton was very pleased with the Senate's swift, bi-
partisan support of the bill. The President remarked: "This leg-
islation will give law enforcement the tools it needs to do
everything possible to prevent this kind of tragedy from happen-
ing again. It will also help us prosecute and punish terrorists
more effectively."13 0
The House did not respond quickly with its version of the
anti-terrorist bill. The bill has been tied up in Congress by con-
servative Republican opposition.1 3 1 The complaints and con-
cerns involve fear that the bill expands federal government
power at the expense of civil liberties.1 3 2  Certain conservative
groups also criticize the bill's broad definition of terrorism.1 3 1
The success of the legislation discussed above will surface in
the coming months and years. The pattern of reactive, rather
than strong proactive leadership may be continuing in the Clin-
ton Administration. Terrorist episodes have hit our backyards.
The need for increased attention to both domestic and interna-
tional terrorism must not be a secondary concern of the Clinton
Administration. 1 34
V. COUNTERTERRORIST INITIATIVES
A. AIRPORT SECURITY AND TECHNOLOGY
History has shown that expert technological devices and good
airport security measures are important tactics in deterring ter-
rorism.1 35 The best security systems make a terrorist's job more
difficult and raise the confidence level of airline passengers.' 36
Providing competent and effective physical security at U.S. and
foreign airports has become a "never-ending technological race
against terrorists." 13 7 This "technological race" began with the
first counterterrorist program.
130 Statement On Senate Passage of Anti-terrorism Legislation, 31 WEEKLY
COMP. PRus. Doc. 993 (June 7, 1995).
131 Kenneth J. Cooper, Anti-Terrorism Bill Gets Hung Up; House GOP Conserva-
tives Object to Expansion of Federal Powers, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 1995, at A4.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 "Attention to legislation to combat domestic and international terrorism
has faded along with public memory of the crumbling federal building," Henry
Hyde, the Judiciary Committee Chairman remarked in August of 1995. Id.
135 SIMON, supra note 7, at 396.
136 Joseph W. Marx, U.S. Strategy toward Aviation Security: A New Look, in TERROR-
ISM AND POLITICS 99, 100 (Barry Rubin ed., 1994).
137 SIMON, supra note 7, at 396.
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The first counterterrorism measure following the dawn of the
"modern age of terrorism," the FAA task force of 1968, devel-
oped the first anti-hijacking system, which included: "(1) notices
to the general public, (2) the use of a 'hijacker profile,' (3) the
use of magnetometers to detect any metal objects on passengers
who met the profile, (4) interviews with selected passengers, and
(5) frisks or searches of suspected passengers. "138
The 1970s witnessed the introduction of metal detectors and
x-ray machines.1 3 9 Unfortunately the technological advances
only served to increase the creativity of terrorists, as they devel-
oped new weapons that became almost undetectable."
In the late 1980s, following the Pan Am Flight 103 tragedy,
the government pushed for improved technology involving
bomb detection. One method, thermal neutron analysis (TNA),
had been developed in the early 1980s. 141 TNA consists of "neu-
tron bombardment of luggage to stimulate gamma ray emissions
from the baggage, which are then analyzed for the presence of
explosives."142 The TNA machine is approximately the size of a
small tractor trailer and can detect all commercial and military
explosives.' 43 But TNA machines have not been installed at all
major airports because of their size (tractor trailer), cost ($1 mil-
lion), and speed (slower than conventional x-ray equipment). 14
Instead the TNA machine has been relegated to the govern-
ment's "technology-development" shelf. Another problem fac-
ing the development and implementation of the systems is the
fact that it can easily become obsolete. Terrorists are constantly
updating and changing their weapons arsenal, and the factors
listed above have forced the government into a hesitant state.
Recently, a Massachusetts manufacturer of explosive detec-
tion systems exposed the inadequacies of U.S. airport bomb de-
tection equipment.?45 Vivid Technologies, a company supplying
equipment throughout Europe and Asia, demonstrated to mem-
138 Dow, supra note 1, at 1160.
139 SIMON, supra note 7, at 397. "There is not much doubt that the federal law
adopted in 1973 requiring passengers to pass through metal detectors has
worked well. There have been no hijackings in this country since 1991." Air
Security Tighter But Flawed, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 20, 1995, at A8.
140 SIMON, supra note 7, at 397.
141 Marx, supra note 136, at 100.
142 Id. at 100-01.
143 Air Security Tighter, supra note 139, at A8.
14 Id.
145 Explosives Risk in U.S. Airports Demonstrated to Members of Congress and Media by
Massachusetts Company, Bus. WiRE, June 1, 1995, at 14:18:00.
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bers of Congress how current conventional x-ray machines do
not adequately screen baggage for explosive devices. 14 6 Vivid
Technology has developed a screening device capable of quickly
scanning airline baggage to detect explosive devices. Many ex-
plosives can be easily molded and shaped to resemble com-
monly packed items-such as food or cloth-making them easy
to disguise and harder for screening operators to detect.147 The
Vivid Rapid Detection System uses an advanced dual-energy X-
Ray technique which screens up to 1500 bags per hour and auto-
matically identifies explosive material. The system has been im-
plemented in over ninety percent of airports in Europe using
bomb detection technology.1 48
Another problem facing airport security involves the lack of
adequate training for airport security personnel. Improved
technology is vital to the government's counterterrorist pro-
gram, but without competent personnel to implement and over-
see the security systems any advances are futile. The
government, through the FAA, provides the leadership and sets
the standards for aviation security. 149 The airlines are responsi-
ble for implementing security measures and absorbing the
costs. 150 In the United States, airlines employ the security per-
sonnel who screen baggage. Employees are poorly trained, and
there is a very high turnover rate.'-" The result is that most
monitors are not attentive and dangerous terrorists have an op-
portunity to board and terrorize unsuspecting- passengers and
crew.
146 Id. Following the Pan Am Flight 103 tragedy, Congress required the FAA to
create standard criteria for certifying explosive detection systems. "The resulting
standard creates a 'Catch-22' by requiring that equipment meet unrealistic per-
formance levels while simultaneously scanning luggage fast enough to be used by
major airports. [As a result, no] action can be taken until explosive detection
equipment is available which is able to meet both of these goals." Id.
147 Id.
148 Id. Co-founder and president, S.' David Ellenbogen, explained to Congress,
"Conventional X-Ray systems were designed to detect weapons, not explosives.
The old perception that civil aviation in the United States is immune to terrorist
threat is changing quickly. Explosive detection technology for the screening of
checked baggage has been embraced by aviation officials outside of the United
States. The irony is that all but a handful of countries are making air travel safer
using American technology which our legislation does not allow using at U.S.
airports." Id.
149 See supra notes 10-14.
150 MARx, supra note 141, at 103. This protocol differs from many foreign air-
lines who benefit from government subsidized airport security.
151 Id.
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Improved technology is only part of the answer. Without a
"watchdog agency" to regulate security personnel, the improved
technology is futile. Airports must be the frontline of defense,
and a DOT report from 1993 reveals that they are failing in this
regard.152 Additionally, a successful security program will also
involve joint cooperation with foreign airports and air carriers.
The idea of raising only the standards of U.S. airports is only a
partial solution. Increased security procedures called for after
the Pan AM Flight 103 disaster have not been carried out at
high-risk airports.1 5
3
The FAA and the ICAO need to jump to the lead in develop-
ing and implementing safety standards for foreign airports. If
the United States acts unilaterally, its actions will not increase
the level of awareness among foreign countries. Multilateral co-
operation is the answer.
B. CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONs/EXTRADITION MEASURES
A very important but often frustrating component of the U.S.
counterterrorist agenda is the extradition process. It is often
the most frustrating device because it almost completely, de-
pends on the cooperation of foreign governments. Extradition
treaties have been characterized as "agreements where both (or
all) parties have the same expectation."1 4 Here is where the
problem lies-if there is no agreement or cooperation, the ex-
tradition process falls through, and the offenders escape
punishment.
In traditional extradition proceedings, one country formally
requests (pursuant to treaty terms) the presentment of a person
to stand trial in the requesting nation. 55 The requesting nation
complies with the request. The' defendant is sent to the country
of the victim's citizenship.1 5 6 Currently, the United States is a
party to over 102 extradition treaties.15 7 The government has
152 Don L. Hubbard, Who's Really at Risk? Airline Security, SEC. MGMT., Mar.
1994, at 40.
153 FAA Faulted on Training for High-Risk Airports, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 19, 1989, at
8C.
154 Richard Allan, Terrorism: Pragmatic International Deterrence and Cooperation, in
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES 30-31 (Institute for East-West Security Studies 1990).
155 Id. at 31.
156 Id.
157 Kristin B. Weissman, Extraterritorial Abduction: The Endangerment of Future
Peace, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 459, 467 (1994). The United States does not have
extradition treaties with 56 countries, including Iran, Libya, and Syria. Id.
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had trouble prosecuting terrorists from countries without extra-
dition treaties.158
The biggest obstacle to successful extradition is the "political
offense exception." The political offense exception
permits the State of capture to refuse to extradite a suspect de-
spite the allegation of an extraditable crime if the State of cap-
ture concludes that the crime alleged was committed either with
a valid political purpose or that the suspect would be subject to
political persecution upon return to the requesting state.' 59
This concept further highlights the problem created by the lack
of a universally accepted definition of terrorism. 160 Without this
definition, many terrorists are able to avoid prosecution and ex-
tradition if the captor state determines that a political motiva-
tion is attached to the terrorist crime which satisfies the state's
definition of "political offense.161
A classic example of the ineffectiveness of the extradition pro-
cess occurred in 1986. In.April of 1986, the Abu Nidal organiza-
tion claimed responsibility for an attack on an Israeli bus. 162
Fourteen months after the attack, Israel formally requested the
extradition of Ahmad, one of three assailants who escaped. 63 It
took the U.S. federal court system three years to extradite
Ahmad. 16 The process was delayed because Ahmad used the
political offense exception to manipulate and distort his extradi-
tion proceedings.165
Our government has found a way to crack the loophole. "Ex-
traterritorial abduction" is a method by which a state enters a
foreign country and forcibly abducts alleged terrorist offend-
ers.166 The Reagan and Bush Administrators employed this ac-
tion, and it appears that President Clinton intends to continue
the policy. 167
158 Id.
159 Liam G. B. Murphy, A Proposal on International Legal Responses to Terrorism, 2
ToUROJ. TRANSNAT'L L. 67, 69 (1991).
160 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
161 Id.
.62 Allan, supra note 154, at 333-34.
163 Id.
164 Id. See generally Ahmad v. Wigen, 726 F. Supp. 389 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd,
910 F.2d 1063 (2d. Cir.), stay denie 497 U.S. 1054.(1990).
165 Allan, supra note 154, at 335.
166 See Weissman, supra note 157, at 468.
167 Id.
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C. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
The most notable American aviation boycott of a foreign
country's air carrier took place during President Reagan's term.
On September 1, 1983, a Soviet Air Force Unit shot down Ko-
rean Airlines Flight 007, which had flown over Soviet coastal ter-
ritory en route to Seoul, Korea.1 68 In response to this incident,
President Reagan requested that the Civil Aeronautics Board
take strict actions against the country. These actions included:
"reaffirming suspension of its operating rights, barring its right
to sell air services in the United States, precluding carriage of
traffic by United States carriers where Aeroflot (Soviet airliner)
was on the itinerary, and precluding U.S. carriers from ac-
cepting tickets or shipping documents issued by Aeroflot."1 69
The sanctions were not effective because the termination of
flights to the Soviet Union by other nations was only temporary
and had no real effect on the Soviet Union. Economic sanctions
imposed independently are not effective. An organized interna-
tional boycott is the best answer and would be the most effective.
In the future, the United States must use its influence to coordi-
nate a united effort with the help of the ICAO and other inter-
national agencies.
D. SAFETY OVERSIGHT OF FOREIGN AIR CARRIERS
The United States has continually shown that it understands
its role in protecting American citizens from foreign enemies.
The Aviation and Security Improvement Act, among other legis-
lative programs, is evidence of this. The United States also ar-
guably understands its role in the international framework of
international aviation. Recently, however, the FAA released a list
of nine nations that are forbidden to serve the United States
because of inadequate safety oversight by the countries.1 70 At
168 Jeffrey D. Laveson, Korean Airline Flight 007: Stalemate in International Avia-
tion Law-Pmposal for Enforcement, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 859, 859 (1985).
169 Gary E. Davidson, United States' Use of Economic Sanctions, Treaty Bending, and
Treaty Breaking in International Aviation, 59J. AIR L. & CoM. 291, 300 (1994).
170 Lisa Burgess, DOT Lists Foreign Airlines Deemed Unsafe, J. COM., Sept. 6, 1994
("Transportation Secretary Federico Pena said Belize, the Dominican Republic,
Gambia, Ghana, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Uruguay and Zaire do not meet
international aviation-safety standards. The countries have been told by the FAA
that their aircraft cannot fly to the United States unless the safety deficiencies are
resolved."); Paul Takemoto, FAA: Carriers From Nine Countries Banned From U.S.
Service, TRAVEL WViux., Sept. 8, 1994, at 31 ("The investigations began in 1991
following a series of accidents in the United States involving foreign aircraft, in-
cluding the crash of a Colombian Avianca 707 jetliner on New York's Long Is-
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first glance it appears this is a giant step by the FAA and DOT to
ensure the safety of American citizens who travel abroad on for-
eign airlines. But a closer look reveals the many problems with
this new announcement and policy. First, the unilateral action
on the part of the U.S. transportation organizations puts a major
land, on January 25, 1990. Until now, the FAA had been keeping the names of
countries under scrutiny confidential, but... this was not consistent with the
Clinton administration's policy of openness."); Tom Rhodes, U.S. Bans Nine For-
eign Airlines as Safety Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1994, at A4.
Compiled as part of the first worldwide survey of 93 governments by
the FAA, the table has also followed the Clinton doctrine of open
government by reversing the organization's normal practice of
keeping the names secret. The countries have been told that they
may work with third countries to certify compliance with interna-
tional regulations or they may lease United States aeroplanes with
American crews to operate their services under the national flag,
thus providing the aviation administration with direct jurisdiction
over safety .... Federico Pena, the Transportation Secretary, said
the FAA was passing judgment on country safety standards, not
those of their national airline. He drew the distinction because
many of those named lease crews and aircraft from the U.S. The
administration sends four people to each country to discover
whether there is a civil aviation authority, the required expertise
and a genuine inclination to enforce the safety standards of the
ICAO.
Rhodes, supra, at A4; see also Poor Pilot Training, Maintenance Erode Foreign Aviation
Safety, AvIATION DAILY, Sept. 6, 1994, at 382 ("Pena said that from now on when
people fly commercially on foreign carriers serving U.S. cities, passengers will
have a new, valuable tool to help them choose a carrier that has an approved civil
aviation authority overseeing its operations."); Edward H. Phillips, GAO TO FAA:
Increase Foreign Airline Safety, AVIATiON WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 24, 1994, at 38.
According to the ICAO agreement, primary responsibility for safety
oversight rests with the nation in which the aircraft are registered.
The FAA relies on these governments to make the comprehensive
safety inspections of airlines flying into the U.S. As a result of its
studies, the GAO is recommending that the FAA:
(1) [p1erform more in-depth inspections of foreign airlines that
are known to have safety problems;
(2) inspect U.S.-registered, foreign-operated aircraft before they
re-enter service in the United States, especially if those ircraft have
been operated by nations that do not comply with ICAO standards;
(3) [e]nsure through follow-up methods that an airline has taken
steps to correct deficiencies identified previously by the agency;
(4) [r]equire owners of U.S.-registered aircraft to notify the agency
when an aircraft is transferred from a foreign to a U.S. lessee;
(5) [i]dentify the parties involved in the transaction, and inspect
the aircraft before it enters service in the U.S. The FAA has not
responded to the last three recommendations, but will address
these in the near future, AnthonyJ. Broderick said.
Id. at 38.
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dent in the credibility of international cooperation in air.
safety. 7' In essence, the FAA's Foreign Aviation Assessment
Programme (FASAP) is a good idea. Nevertheless, in going it
alone the FAA missed the opportunity of incorporating the
views of countries that do not share the advantages of wealth
and experience which the United States has. In so doing, it has
done nothing to ensure that the rest of the world will have any
sympathy for its actions or be encouraged to improve interna-
tional air safety. That, in turn, means that the airlines and coun-
tries that have failed the FAA test of acceptability will have little
incentive to do anything other than the bare minimum to get
off the FAA's list of "under-achievers." 172
Secondly, the action may have unfairly blemished all of Latin
American aviation.1 73 Although there were ten Central and
South American countries, plus the several members of the Or-
ganization of Eastern Caribbean States that have adhered to the
Annex 6 standards set by the Chicago Convention, the impres-
sion is that all of Latin America's carriers are unsafe. 174 While
some of these countries can improve their aviation oversight,
the truth is that most of the Latin countries recently banned
have been operating to the United States for many years with a
high degree of safety.175 The intent of the U.S. actions is noble;
increased awareness is certainly important for improved interna-
tional air safety. But we must also question the cost to interna-
171 Editorial, Safety in Isolation-Airline Safety, FLIGHT INT'L, Sept. 14, 1994, at 3.
In an ideal world, the correct approach of the FAA would have
been to take its findings, not in isolation, but having completed its
assessment, to the ICAO, or a similar international body, and asked
that body to consider those findings and rule accordingly .... The
lack of united action means that the FAA's initiative cannot be
guaranteed to have any positive effect on the nations which have
been branded as inadequate.
Id.
172 Latin Interests Want DOT to Clarify Oversight Issue, AVIATION DAILY, Sept. 20,
1994, at 463 ("Latin American airline interests are worried that the DOT's recent
revelation that a number of Latin countries are among governments that do not
meet international safety oversight standards may have, or is having, an adverse
impact on some of the region's carriers.").
173 Id.
174 ROBERT D. PAPKIN, SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE U.S. GOVERNMENT POLICY
REGARDING FOREIGN AviATION OVERSIGHT PROGRAMS (1994) (Robert D. Papkin is
an attorney in Washington, D.C. who specializes in aviation litigation and cur-
rently represents a number of the Latin American countries in their dealings with
the FAA and other United States aviation organizations).
175 Id.
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tional cooperation. 176 Papkin identifies two major problems
with this unilateral action:
First, the lesson of the economic sanction should have been a
lesson learned for the government; unilateral action is not as ef-
fective as multilateral negotiations and cooperation. The ICAO
is the governing body for international aviation, and therefore
they should be the organization to oversee the safety oversight of
the foreign air carriers in the long run. Secondly, the problem of
international cooperation is thrown out of the door by this ac-
tion. The contracting states to the Chicago Convention and who
fall under the auspice of the ICAO will not be pleased with the
United States. 177
V. CONCLUSION
The U.S. and international response to international air safety
and terrorism falls along an interesting continuum. The meth-
odology has been a gradualist approach rather than a clear,
comprehensive program. The historical development of the
FAA and ICAO programs reveals a framework that can be im-
proved. Both agencies must come together and bolster the in-
ternational community's legal and problem-solving framework.
The immediate focus should be on strengthening existing multi-
lateral conventions on hijacking and terrorist attacks. Words
look great on paper, but a sound enforcement mechanism in
the form of an international court for terrorists can provide a
proper forum for punishing offenders.
The government must continue to support multilateral coop-
eration. The United States has an important leadership role in
the post-Cold War era. As the reigning "Superpower" we must
continue to improve on our past successes. Technological im-
provements for aircraft and airports must be quickly funded,
researched, and implemented. The faster terrorists -improve
their weapons or change their mode of attack, the quicker our
government must be able to develop new weapons for the
counter-attack. 178 In the area of technology, we must continue
to pool our resources and capabilities to ensure that our airports
are safe and secure for all travelers.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 In 1992, the FAA and U.S. Air Force began work on developing a "bomb-
resistant jet." This is an example of important new technology that may make
our skies safer. See William M. Carley, Transportation: Idea of a Bomb Resistant Jet
Takes Off, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 1992, at B1.
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The use of military force is another option. The U.S. armed
forces encompass a well-trained and professional group. If
given the right terrain and leadership directive, the use of mili-
tary strikes may serve as a major deterrent to terrorists
nationwide.
The American judicial system is another component that
should not be overlooked. The government must ensure that,
bilateral extradition treaties are respected. The remaining na-
tions who are not parties to our extradition agreements must be
joined.
Lastly, the importance of the individual men and women who
work so hard at implementing the above programs should not
be disregarded. The real heroes of the Bush Administration
counterterrorist program are the "Victims of Pan Am Flight
103." The "first line of defense" at our nation's airports is the
group of men and women who screen our luggage at. the airport
terminals. The flight crews who train and work daily to provide
a safe and comfortable flight are important factors, instrumental
to our counterterrorist program.
The recent fiftieth anniversary of the Chicago Convention is a
testament to the courage and cooperation of those concerned
with international air safety. The challenge for the ICAO, FAA,
and the U.S. bureaucracy involves making the commitment to
act together and move forward into the next century with a
clear, organized, and effective "attack" against all international
terrorist "bullies."
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